Guns, money and politics: disorder in the Solomon Islands by Dinnen, Sinclair
'Arc of lnstoblllty'? Meloneslo in the early 2axJs 
to a broadly held consensus on the need for peace, order and stability, something 
perhaps akin to the slow development of similar norms in other parts of the 
world that are often seen as being part of the development of the rule of law or 
of the emergence of civil society. Bougainville experience suggests that it may 
be necessary to lake a long view of instability and chaos and their consequences, 
and perhaps to rethink some policies. 
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For many observers, the elections scheduled for late 2001 offered a possible 
circuit breaker to Solomon Islands' deepening political crisis. Behind the crisis 
lay four years of ethnic tensions, a de facto coup in June 2000, and a progressive 
collapse of the economy and, in many places, law and order. The incumbent 
Sogavare administration had come to power as a result of the coup instigated by 
an ethnically-based militia group, the Malaitan Eagle Force (MEF), and 
elements of the paramilitary police field force. As a result, it had little 
legitimacy in the eyes of many Solomon islanders and, moreover, appeared quite 
incapable of providing the leadership necessary to restore peace and stability. 
During its period in office, the economy had gone into free fall, with all major 
commercial enterprises suspended, and there was growing evidence of 
systematic conuption and plunder among political leaders, senior officials, and 
their militant associates. Since the coup, Honiara, the national capital on 
Guadalcanal, had been under the effective control of bands of anned militants. 
The police force remained deeply divided and was no longer able or willing to 
enforce the law. 
Sadly, the new government formed after the December 2001 elections and led 
by Sir Allan Kemakeza has not lived up to expectations. It is made up of 
remnants of the Sogavare administration and includes several high-profile 
former members of the MEF. While there have been some signs of 
improvement, including in the critical area of disarmament, the national 
economy continues to verge on bankruptcy, essential services have ceased in 
many places, public servants go unpaid, and corruption and lack of security 
remain serious concerns. The Kernakeza government appears incapable of 
leading the Solomon Islands out of its current predicament and, in the view of 
many observers, there is a clear need for far greater engagement by the main 
regional players, notably Australia and New Zealand. 
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Background to the conflict 
The deeper roots of the current crisis lie in the legacies of colonial rule, the 
performance of successive post-independence governments, and the impacts of 
more recent processes of globalization. As with Papua New Guinea and 
Vanuatu, the challenges of nation-building in such a diverse and fragmented 
environment are formidable. There is still little sense of unity binding the 
disparate communities scattered throughout the archipelago. Over eighty 
languages are spoken among a population of less than half a million people. 
The weak post-colonial state has little presence in the daily lives of most 
Solomon [slanders, the vast majority of whom are subsistence farmers in rural 
villages. Primary identities and allegiances remain implanted in language and 
kin-based associations rather than in abstracted notions of 'nation' and 
'citizenship'. 
The centralization of political power has been resisted actively at local levels 
since the beginning of colonial administration. In the period immediately 
preceding independence in 1978, several districts sought to loosen or sever ties 
with the political centre, including the well-known 'breakaway' movement in 
what is now Western Province (Bennett 1987: 327-330). The provincial 
government system established in 1981 did little to allay suspicions of central 
government in Honiara (Larmour 1985). Wealthier provinces continue to resent 
the meagre benefits received from central government in return for the 
substantial contribution they make to national revenues through logging and 
fishing. 
When the national capital was relocated to Honiara after the Second World War, 
migrants were drawn to Guadalcanal from other parts of the country. Large 
numbers came from the densely populated and resource-poor island of Malaita. 
They were attracted by the prospect of employment in the plantations, in the 
government departments and businesses in Honiara, or, since 1997, in the Gold 
Ridge mine to the east of the capital. Resentment towards 'settlers' grew among 
Guadalcanal communities, often inflamed by opportunist local leaders. It has 
been most marked among those living in the least developed and least accessible 
parts of Guadalcanal, notably the Weather Coast in the south of the island. 
Malaitan settlers, in particular, are accused of being aggressive and insensitive 
to local kastom and are viewed by many to have prospered unfairly at the 
expense of indigenes. 
These tensions are bound up with deeper anxieties about land, development, and 
identity, that are shared by most Solomon islanders. They have been aggravated 
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on Guadalcanal by the fact that customary land has been sold to outsiders. This 
has created enormous resentment among a younger generation of Guadalcanal 
people who have thereby been dispossessed of their inheritance. Rather than 
blaming those who sold the land, anger has been directed against the Malaitans 
who have bought, rented or squatted on land in north Guadalcanal. In December 
1998, these grievances crystallized into indigenous demands for rent for the use 
of Honiara as the national capital, compensation for local people killed by 
settlers, plus restrictions on citizens from other provinces owning land on 
Guadalcanal (Petition by the Indigenous People of Guadalcanal, 1998). 
Incompetent and corrupt governments have contributed to the legitimacy crisis 
of the post-colonial state. This manifests itself in growing levels of popular 
disenchantment with the formal political process and, in many provincial 
islands, in a spread of autonomy sentiments. Unemployment and limited 
economic opportunities are a major impediment to the aspirations of a young 
and rapidly growing population. The narrow economic base inherited from 
colonial times has meant a high level of dependence on the vagaries of 
international commodity markets. Low commodity prices, rising oil prices and 
the Asian financial crisis have all had adverse impacts in recent years and 
Solomon Islands is increasingly dependent on international development 
assistance and commercial loans. 
The coup 
Groups of young Guadalcanal men began stockpiling homemade and 
rehabilitated Second World War weapons as early as 1996 (Kabutaulaka 2001). 
Organized disturbances started in late 1998 and spread rapidly throughout rural 
parts of the island. Militant groups - known initially as the Guadalcanal 
Revolutionary Army (GRA) and later renamed the lsatabu Freedom Movement 
(IFM) - embarked on a violent campaign of harassment and intimidation, 
directed mainly against Malaitan settlers. Up to 20,000 people were displaced 
from their homes in rural Guadalcanal and forced to seek refuge in Honiara or 
return to their islands of origin. Violent confrontations occurred between the 
GRA/IFM and the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP). In June 1999, the 
government declared a state of emergency in Guadalcanal. 
In response to a request from the SI government, the Commonwealth sent 
former Fijian Prime Minister, Sitiveni Rabuka, as a special envoy to help 
conclude a peaceful resolution to the crisis on Guadalcanal. A series of peace 
agreements brokered by Rabuka committed the government to address the 
concerns of the rural Guadalcanal population and restrain police operations, and 
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called on the militant groups to disband, surrender their weapons, and return to 
their home villages. However, they failed to stem the spreading militancy. 
With the IFM in effective control of rural Guadalcanal, Honiara became a 
Malaitan enclave. Another armed group - the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) -
emerged at the beginning of 2000. This group, with close Links to the 
paramilitary police field force, claimed to represent the interests of displaced 
Malaitans and demanded substantial compensation for the lives of Malaitans 
killed by the IFM and for damage and destruction to their properties. The MEF 
had access to high-powered police weapons, uniforms and equipment, and began 
attacking and intimidating suspected IFM members and sympathizers in the 
Honiara area. With the security situation on Guadalcanal, particularly around 
Honiara, deteriorating rapidly, the SIAC (Solomon Islands Alliance for Change) 
government made a desperate plea for anned assistance from Australia and New 
Zealand. However, neither government was prepared to intervene and called 
upon the parties to devise appropriate local solutions. 
On 5 June 2000, MEF militants, together with members of the paramilitary 
police field force, seized control of key installations in Honiara, including the 
well-stocked national armoury. Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa'alu was 
forced to resign and was replaced by the opposition leader, Manasseh Sogavare. 
Following this de facto coup, acts of intimidation and reprisals against civilians 
by militants increased. Honiara was under the control of an illegal 'joint 
operation' between the MEF and elements of the police. The new government 
was neither capable of challenging, nor inclined to challenge, the heavily armed 
militant group that had brought it to power. Attacks were launched by the joint 
operation against suspected IFM positions on the outskirts of the capital and an 
Australian-donated patrol boat was used to shell positions on the eastern 
shoreline. Homes and property belonging to those deemed opposed to the 
armed takeover were looted or destroyed. Vehicles were stolen and business 
houses intimidated. Honiara was effectively cut off from the rest of the country. 
These events had a disastrous impact on the national economy. Operations were 
suspended at the Gold Ridge mine after the coup, as they had been earlier at 
Solomon Islands Plantations. Government revenue dropped dramatically. As 
the impact of events in Honiara sank in, shock turned to anger in many other 
parts of the country. There were reports of intimidation against Malaitans in the 
Western Province (STBC 18 June 2000). These led to reprisals against non-
Malaitans in Honiara, setting off a vicious cycle of retaliatory actions. There 
was also concern about possible spillover effects from Bougainville, which was 
emerging from a protracted civil war (see Regan, this volume). Members of the 
30 
Guns. money and politics: disorder tn the Solomon Islands 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were reported to be providing security 
in Choiseul and Western provinces against incursions by the MEF (The National 
[Papua New Guinea) 12 June 2000). Autonomy sentiments were re-ignited in 
several provinces. 
The Sogavare government commenced its peacemaking efforts by paying SI$10 
million to provincial and militant representatives from Malaita and Guadalcanal 
for a range of outstanding grievances on both sides. Dispensing large amounts 
of compensation was to become the central pillar of the government's 
peacemaking strategy. Compensation has a long history in parts of the Solomon 
Islands as a means of settling disputes between groups. Over the years it has 
been extended beyond the kastom context to a variety of non-traditional 
situations, including claims against the state (Akin 1999). In practice, it has 
become increasingly commercialized, with monetary payments replacing 
traditional items of wealth. This has opened up new opportunities for self-
enrichment and abuse. While by no means the first government to employ this 
practice, the use of compensation by the Sogavare administration has 
contributed significantly to the disorder over the past two years. 
The Townsville Peace Agreement 
Having declined earlier requests for assistance by the Ulufa'alu government, 
reinvigorated efforts were made by Australia and New Zealand to bring the 
militant groups to the negotiating table. The immediate priority was to end the 
fighting between the militant groups. Talks brokered by the Australians resulted 
in the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement in August 2000. The next step was to 
conclude a substantive peace settlement between the combatants. 
Approximately 130 delegates were flown to an Australian military base in 
Townsville for this purpose. They included militant leaders, representatives 
from the various provincial authorities, and the national government. The 
Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) was signed on 15 October 2000. 
Under the provisions of the TPA, members of the police who had abandoned 
their posts to engage in militant activities were eligible to return to the force 
without fear of sanctions. An act of parliament was to provide a general 
amnesty to members of militant groups for criminal acts committed during the 
course of the 'ethnic crisis', as well as for any civil liability arising from such 
acts. In return, militants were to surrender all weapons and ammunition within 
thirty days of the signing of the agreement under the supervision of an 
International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT). A Peace Monitoring Council 
was to be established 'to monitor, report on and enforce the terms of the 
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agreement'. Former combatants were to be repatriated to their home villages in 
Guadalcanal and Malaita and provided with counselling and rehabilitation 
services. The government was to seek international assistance to help 
recompense those who had suffered material loss as a result of the conflict. 
The TP A succeeded in ending the fighting and its signing was greeted by 
spontaneous celebrations on the streets of Honiara. In retrospect, however, it 
did not provide a sustainable framework for the peace process and its 
shortcomings have become increasingly apparent with the passage of time. Its 
provisions reflected the views of the militant groups, in particular those of the 
more powerful and articulate MEF leadership. The voices of the wider Solomon 
Islands civil society, who had been the most active proponents of peace and 
moderation, were excluded. The provisions of the TP A assumed that the two 
militant groups were cohesive and structured bodies capable of fulfilling their 
obligations under the agreement. In reality, divisions had always existed in both 
entities based around loyalties to particular leaders, places of origin, language, 
kinship ties and so on. Harold Keke, a maverick Guadalcanal militant from the 
Weather Coast, refused to be a party to the agreement. Factionalism increased 
in both groups after the signing of the TPA. In the case of the former IFM, this 
degenerated, in some places, into armed feuds between rival leaders - who were 
often related to each other. The process of fragmentation hinted at the critical 
role of a more complex and dynamic local politics being played out beneath the 
rubric of ethnic tensions and discrete militant groups. 
Under the TPA, the disarmament process was to be driven by the former militant 
groups themselves, rather than by an independent enforcement body. Weapons 
in the possession of the militants were to be handed over to their conunanders 
and then placed under the control of unarmed members of the IPMT at selected 
sites in Guadalcanal and Malaita. The role of the IPMT, comprising 35 
Australians and 14 New Zealanders, was to monitor and observe the 
dis.armament process, rather than enforce it. The fragmentation of the militant 
groups complicated matters by dissolving the chains of command that were 
necessary to progress disarmament under the agreement. 
While civil society groups had called for any amnesty provisions to be linked to 
a truth and reconciliation process, the TPA allowed those who had engaged in 
serious human rights abuses to escape any form of personal accountability. This 
failure to address issues of justice added greatly to the challenges of restoring 
the rule of law. It was hard to promote the authority of law when known 
criminals had been granted total immunity for the consequences of their actions. 
Likewise with the provisions allowing former militants to rejoin the police. 
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Many retained their illegally acquired weapons and maintained links with 
militants. Their presence, particularly among senior ranks, intimidated other 
officers and contributed to the continuing paralysis of the force. In the eyes of 
ordinary Solomon islanders, the police had become a tainted, partisan and 
corrupt institution. 
The use of monetary compensation as the principal instrument for redressing 
grievances raised unrealistic expectations on the part of thousands of people 
affected by the conflict, generated further divisions between claimants, and 
provided ample opportunities for abuse. One of the most fundamental 
weaknesses of the TPA was that it sought to provide a single comprehensive 
settlement. By contrast, the Bougainville peace process has involved a rolling 
series of negotiations and agreements. The TPA constituted a static agreement 
that was incapable of adjusting to the rapidly changing circumstances on the 
ground. It was also premised on quite unrealistic assumptions about the 
capacity of the profoundly weak Solomon Islands state to implement its 
provisions. 
The instrumentalization of disorder 
A priority after the signing of the TP A was to disarm and demobilize former 
militants. Approximately 500 high-powered weapons, with ammunition, had 
been seized from police armouries by the MEF in the lead-up to the coup. 
While they possessed some automatic weapons, the IFM arsenal consisted 
largely of homemade and rehabilitated Second World War weapons. When the 
thirty-day deadline for surrendering weapons expired in mid November 2000, 
approximately 800, mainly homemade, guns had been handed in. The deadline 
was extended several times over the following year and a half. Disarmament 
was impeded by lack of an effective enforcement process. Former militants and 
others also appreciated the strategic value of the gun in an environment where 
law enforcement had effectively collapsed. 
On the matter of demobilization, the government agreed to pay repatriation 
allowances in order to induce former militants to return to their villages of 
origin. Further payments were provided for accommodation and the hiring of 
vehicles and canoes. For some, repatriation schemes became an opportunity for 
making money. For example, many former militants who had been repatriated 
to Malaita simply turned around and returned to Honiara to collect further 
payments. By the end of April 2001, the government had reportedly paid out 
SI$40 million to ex-militants (Pacnews 1 March 2001). The manner in which 
these funds were distributed by ex-militant leaders generated further conflict, as 
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did rumours that some individuals and groups and were being paid more than 
others (SIBC 23 November 2000). 
Another scheme to absorb ex-militants was their appointment as special 
constables, ostensibly to help in the restoration of law and order. Each special 
constable was put on the government payroll. Like the repatriation allowances, 
this scheme was highly susceptible to abuse. By the end of 2001, the number of, 
mainly Maliatan, special constables had grown to nearly 2000 and the scheme 
had become a major drain on scarce government resources. Ill-disciplined 
special constables with access to illegal weapons became a source of 
lawlessness in many areas. On several occasions Sogavare proposed that former 
militants become the nucleus of a new Solomon Islands Defence Force. This 
proposal met with vigorous opposition from many quarters and, fortunately, 
proceeded no further. 
In the post-Townsville period, escalating lawlessness and the deteriorating 
economic situation became the outstanding concerns, surpassing the original 
ethnic tensions on which the TPA peace process was based. Honiara was the 
hub of growing disorder involving the activities of former militants, criminals, 
corrupt leaders and assorted opportunists. The line between ex-militants and 
criminals became blurred in practice. In view of the weakness of government 
and police, those with guns could act with impunity. Ministers, public servants 
and business people complained of regular harassment by ex-militants in respect 
of compensation demands (SIBC 7 October 2001). As the financial situation 
deteriorated, ex-militants began threatening bank staff who refused to accept 
government cheques (SIBC 1 February 2001). The practice of demanding 
compensation on the slightest pretext was widespread and often amounted to 
little more than criminal extortion. 
While these problems were concentrated in Honiara, the dispersal of former 
militants and guns was followed by an increase in criminality and banditry in 
many rural areas, particularly in Guadalcanal and Malaita. 
The Peace Monitoring Council attempted to initiate a review of the TP A in 
September 2001 (Radio Australia 14 September 2001). This had to include the 
parties to the initial agreement. A notable irony was that the review process 
entailed reconstituting the original militant entities that had, in large part, 
dispersed and disbanded in the period since the TP A was signed. In the event, 
the review was suspended after the former IFM delegation withdrew following 
the brutal murder of a one of their ex-commanders (Pacnews 24 September 
2001). 
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Funding the increasingly corrupted compensation process was a major 
challenge. More than 50 per cent of compensation claims were fraudulent, 
according to the acting auditor general (S/BC 12 July 2001). With little prospect 
of assistance from donors, the government negotiated a large commercial loan 
from a private Taiwanese bank (Sydney Morning Herald 10 April 2001). 
Shortly after the arrival of the first tranche, the deputy prime minister, Sir Allan 
Kemakeza, and his permanent secretary were accused of allocating themselves 
payments of SI$800,000 and SI$700,000 respectively for properties allegedly 
destroyed during the conflict (SIBC 26 July 2001). Both were dismissed for 
misleading cabinet and having 'serious, personal vested interests' in the 
compensation scheme. At the same time, the administration was granting 
generous duty remissions and tax exemptions to selected individuals and 
businesses. This was a way of rewarding supporters, repaying political debts, 
and compromising potential critics. It was also a response to intimidation and 
threats, and a way of buying off the more troublesome ex-militant leaders. 
Despite the acute financial crisis, millions of dollars of national revenue were 
foregone in remissions on cigarettes and beer imports (SIBC 18 July 2001). 
While these developments were taking place, other parts of the country were 
suffering the consequences of the prolonged crisis at the political centre. Health 
and other provincial grants had fallen into serious arrears. Public sector unions, 
representing around 8000 members, threatened a nationwide strike unless they 
received their pay and unless all duty remissions were cancelled (Radio 
Australia 7 September 2001 ). Provincial premiers issued a joint conununique in 
August 2001 claiming that the central government owed the provinces and 
Honiara City Council more than SI$16,800,000 in grants and arrears. The 
already fragile character of national unity was threatened further by growing 
pressures for autonomy in several island provinces. 
The Kemakeza government - continuing decline 
The overwhelming desire for change on the part of ordinary voters was reflected 
in the December 2001 election results. Only 18 sitting members of the 50-seat 
national parliament were returned. Unfortunately the post-election process of 
government formation was less susceptible to the weight of public opinion. The 
civil society network alleged that large sums of money were offered to the 32 
new members to back particular candidates for the position of prime minister 
(PINA Nius Online 16 December 2001). Sir Allan Kemakeza's People's 
Alliance Party (PAP) emerged as the largest coalition, with 20 seats. Ousted 
Prime Minister Ulufa'alu' s Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC) won 
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12 seats. However, amid rumours that there would be another coup if Ulufa'alu 
returned to power, SIAC changed their nomination for prime minister to Pattison 
Oti. Ulufa'alu promptly withdrew from SIAC, taking 6 Liberal Party members 
with him, thereby scuttling SIAC's chances of resuming office. Sir Allan 
Kemakeza was declared prime minister on 17 December 2001. 
Many Solomon Islanders greeted the announcement of the composition of the 
'new' government with dismay. Kemakeza had been discredited and eventually 
sacked for his handling of the compensation scheme as a minister in the 
Sogavare administration, and was known to have close links to the MEF. 
Snyder Rini, who had been Sogavare's Finance minister and had approved up to 
SI$80 million in duty remissions (SIBC 15 December 2001), became the new 
deputy prime minister. In addition, a number of former MEF leaders were 
appointed as ministers, raising the spectre of deepening collusion between 
government leaders and militant elements. They included former member of the 
MEF supreme council and Honiara businessman, Alex Bartlett, who was 
appointed foreign minister. The post of minister for Police, National Security 
and Justice was given to another former militant, Benjamin Una. He had 
previously commanded one of the Australian-donated patrol boats used to attack 
Guadalcanal positions after the coup. Another ex-militant, Daniel Fa'afauna, 
was appointed minister for Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment. 
The policy priorities of the new administration were the restoration of law and 
order and revival of the economy (Sydney Morning Herald 18 December 2001). 
These were also the conditions for securing much-needed international 
development assistance. On the law and order front, this meant getting the 
police force working again. Initial signs were not promising. No arrests had 
been made for a number of outstanding crimes, despite the fact that the identity 
of the suspects was common knowledge. These included the alleged killers of 
the former IFM leader, Selwyn Saki, whose murder had derailed the review of 
the TP A. They also included the person responsible for killing a New Zealand 
consultant in Honiara in mid-February (Solomon Star 13 February 2002). Prime 
Minister Kemakeza approached the Australian and New Zealand governments 
requesting overseas police to work alongside SI officers (PINA Nius Online 24 
March 2002). Australia declined but has continued its institutional 
strengthening with the Solomon Islands police, using advisers rather than 
officers in line positions. New Zealand has agreed recently to send ten officers 
to work with local police (SIBC 19 August 2002), while the United Kingdom 
government will provide a replacement for the current police commissioner 
when his contract expires later in the year. 
36 
Guns. money and pol/tics: disorder In the Solomon Islands 
At the beginning of 2002 several incidents involving Bougainvillean gunmen 
were reported from Western province, including a spectacular shooting spree in 
Gizo township (Solomon Star 4 February 2002). In late February, two Malaitan 
special constables were allegedly killed by Bougainvilleans in Noro, Western 
Province. This immediately led to retaliatory acts by Malaitan ex-militants 
against Westerners in Honiara. Matters relating to the presence of 
Bougainvilleans in the Western Province, and also of Solomon Islanders in 
Bougainville, are now the subject of border talks between authorities in Honiara 
and Port Moresby (PINA Nius Online 6 March 2002). 
The latest, and ostensibly the final, deadline for the surrendering of weapons 
under the TP A expired on 31 May 2002 and, according to the Peace Monitoring 
Council, resulted in the surrender of more guns and ammunition than any of its 
predecessors. While no exact or reliable figures are available, the weapons 
surrendered included a number of high-powered weapons. The . majority of 
weapons originally stolen from police armouries, however, remain at large 
(SIBC 11 June 2002). The Australian-led lPMT has been phased out, with 
Australian assistance now being directed at strengthening the Peace Monitoring 
Council (PacNews 22 February 2002). The rationale for the withdrawal was 
that the lPMT has fulfilled its monitoring mandate under the Townsville Peace 
Agreement. 
Several meetings were held between a senior government envoy and the 
maverick Guadalcanal leader Harold Keke on the Weather Coast earlier in the 
year. There had been promising indications that Keke and his Guadalcanal 
Liberation Front (GLF) were preparing to enter the peace process that they had 
hitherto rejected. However, this progress came to a sudden halt after the 
'massacre' of ten Malaitans who had travelled to the Weather Coast in early 
June in order to capture or kill Keke (Pacific Islands Report 28 June 2002). The 
exact details of what happened, including the identity of the parties behind the 
raid, remain unclear, although the killings have been confirmed. Keke has 
become a ruthless and unpredictable warlord and his Weather Coast territory has 
become a no-go zone for outsiders, including the police and other government 
representatives. His latest outrage was the brutal murder in August of a 
government minister and member for the South Guadalcanal constituency, 
Father Augustine Geve. Keke has claimed that Father Geve was killed because 
he had misused funds intended for his constituency (PINA Nius Online 23 
August 2002). Keke's reign of terror in south Guadalcanal constitutes a major 
obstacle to peace, and continues to impede the disarmament process. Following 
Geve's murder, the Police minister appealed to Australia and New Zealand for 
assistance in apprehending Keke (PacNews 27 August 2002). 
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Althoug.h much remains to be done in the area of reconciliation, several key 
players m the events of June 2000 have made gestures in this direction. Andrew 
Nori, the former MEF spokesperson, hosted a reconciliation ceremony with 
some of the members of the former SIAC government that he had helped oust 
from office (Solomon Star 12 February 2002). Foreign Minister Alex Bartlett, a 
f~rmer m~mber of the ~F supreme council, has apologized in parliament for 
his ro~~ i_n the conflict and expressed his willingness to engage in the 
reconc1bation process (SIBC 5 April 02). While understandably greeted with 
extreme scepticism in many quarters, these gestures might prompt other players 
to review their personal roles in the events of the past few years. Attempts at 
reconciliation and peace-building at the grassroots level have been more low-
key and have been facilitated by churches, women's groups and community 
leaders. !he Melanesian Brothers, who were courageous agents of peace during 
the confhct, have continued their role in the area of reconciliation. 
In addition to law and order and the peace process, the other major focus of 
gov~rnment attention has been the economy. By the beginning of the year, 
pubbc debt had reached critical levels with rapidly diminishing foreign reserves 
and a total outstanding debt burden of SI$1.3 billion (Solomon Star 30 July 
2002). Immediately after the elections, Kemakeza announced his intention of 
redu.cing the gov~rnment payroll from SI$200 million to SI$i50 million though 
detatls on how this was to be achieved remained vague. A visiting mission from 
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund, made clear their unwillingness to provide further funds until the Solomon 
Islands had settled outstanding arrears (Solomon Star 15 March 2002). Finance 
Minister. Michael. Maina introduced a tight budget in March that was, among 
other things, designed to address the immediate concerns of the multilateral 
a~encies and donor community. He also caught everyone off guard by 
stmultaneously announcing an immediate 25 per cent devaluation of the SI 
dollar. While this move received support from the Central Bank, it split the 
Ke~eza cab~net. Strongest opposition came from Snyder Rini and his group 
of mdependents who formed the largest bloc in the government. Under 
mounting political pressure, Kemakeza sacked Maina and the devaluation was 
sub~e~uently revoked (PINA Nius Online 4 April 2002). More recently, 
Mama s replacement has proposed replacing the SI dollar with Australian 
currency, despite being advised against this by the International Monetary Fund 
(Pacnews 29 August 2002). 
As the economic situation has deteriorated, the government has become more 
desperate to raise revenue and cut expenditure. In the first six months of 2002, 
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it had allegedly overspent by SI$28 million dollars on salaries and wages alone 
(PINA Nius Online 31 July 2002). Attempts to reduce spending by proposing the 
termination of 1,300 public servants has met with strong opposition from the 
trade unions (PINA Nius Online 30 July 2002). Teachers, medical staff, airport 
employees and others have resorted to rolling strikes in protest over non-
payment of wages. Amid rumours that the final tranche of the Taiwanese loan 
to pay compensation had arrived, claimants laid siege to the Treasury offices 
and razor wire has now been erected around key government offices (SIBC 5 
August 2002). 
A number of ill-conceived fund-raising schemes have been proposed and then 
abandoned in the face of strong opposition. For example, in April reports 
surfaced that the government was considering selling 80 per cent of equity in the 
Solomon Islands Development Bank to Melbourne-based company, ACC-
AMCO (SIBC 11 April 2002). A year earlier, an adviser to the Sogavare 
government had signed a memorandum of agreement with AMCO that would 
have provided the company with extensive rights to engage in mining, tourism, 
logging, fishing, banking, printing, and a range of service activities. The 
agreement did not proceed after the Central Bank cast doubts on the company's 
credentials. The adviser in question had since become minister for Commerce 
in the Kemakeza government and was lobbying vigorously on behalf of the 
company. The planned sale was eventually shelved as a result of vigorous 
opposition by, among others, the board of the Development Bank (Solomon Star 
23 April 2002). 
Even more controversial was the proposal to dump toxic waste from Taiwan on 
the island of Makira. This was another scheme carried over from the Sogavare 
administration (PINA Nius Online 7 February 2002). It aroused immediate 
opposition from a range of groups, including senior public servants, opposition 
politicians, community groups, and local and international environmental 
groups. After considerable wavering, Prime Minister Kemakeza announced that 
his government was opposed to any form of toxic dumping in the Solomon 
Islands (SICA Press Release 18 June 2002). There have also been allegations 
that a Taiwan-based company has been selling Solomon Islands passports in 
Asia (SIBC 11 May 2002). 
In retrospect, the high expectations in the lead-up to the 2001 election appear to 
have been misplaced. Ousting the discredited and compromised Sogavare 
administration was by no means the sole issue. The more daunting political 
challenge was to put in place a government capable of providing firm and 
independent leadership. This required severing the hold that certain parties to 
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the 2000 coup had been able to exercise over Sogavare and his ministerial 
colleagues ~d tha~ ~ad contributed in significant ways to the deepening political 
and econonuc cns1s. The composition of the newly-formed government 
suggeste~ that this was unlikely to happen and subsequent developments have 
borne this out. There has been a reluctance to take hard decisions and a 
readiness to follow the path of least resistance. The coercive arm of the state _ 
the police_ force - remains incapacitated and serious crimes, including murder, 
go u~pumshed. In large parts of rural Guadalcanal, the rule of law has 
effectively ~ollap~ed and been replaced by brutal family feuds waged between 
former ethnic alltes. As funds for wages and services dry up, the arrival of 
comp~nsation from Taiwan generates a feeding frenzy among claimants 
(g_enume and bogus) and inevitably leads to further divisions and conflict. 
Disenchantment with the formal political process has now reached dangerous 
new levels. 
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The constitutional crisis which erupted in Vanuatu in May 2001 initially 
prompted fears that Vanuatu might follow the examples of the Solomon Islands 
and Fiji and descend into social unrest, and possibly violent conflict. The 
greater danger was that the ailing administration of Barak Tame Sope 
Mau'utamate would mobilize the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) to consolidate 
its hold on power. 
The crisis was triggered by an attempted motion of no confidence in Prime 
Minister Barak Sope, authored jointly by the Vanua'aku Pati (VP) and Sope's 
former coalition partner, the Union of Moderate Parties (UMP). The pressing 
issue for the Vanua'aku Pati was the country's worsening financial situation, 
especially in light of a clandestine deal between Sope and Indian Thai 
businessman Amerendra Nath Ghosh, involving the issue of $US300 million 
from the Reserve Bank. The UMP had defected to the opposition in the month 
before the commencement of the parliamentary session. For almost two months 
during its scheduled first session for 2001 the Vanuatu Parliament was 
incapacitated because the Speaker, Paul Ren Tari, refused to allow debate on the 
motion. The Vanuatu Supreme Court upheld the validity of the motion, but 
Sope claimed that his coalition was the victim of foreign interference and a 
political conspiracy between the government and the state law offices that 
culminated in a 'libellous' motion of no confidence. Throughout, Sope and his 
allies maintained pressure on VP and UMP backbenchers in the hope of 
inducing defections by marginalized MPs for whom personal allegiance might 
be considered a tradable commodity. Despite consistent pressure, the 
government of Edward Natapei emerged victorious from the constitutional crisis 
and Vanuatu remained peaceful, although the events set in train a year of further 
political manoeuvring which culminated in the arrest and conviction of Sope on 
charges of forgery and the intervention of elements of the police and the VMF in 
national politics. 
1 I would like to thank Daniel Oakman, Jenny Brown, Donald Denoon and Ron May for their comments on 
drafts of this paper. 
